Constitution

The following text is a transcription of the Constitution as it was inscribed by Jacob Shallus on parchment (the document on display in the Rotunda at the National Archives Museum.) The spelling and punctuation reflect the original.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

The Constitution is concerned with the checks and balances of the institutions of the country. This intro sets out the stated goals--defense, Welfare, future citizens and their ability to pursue Liberty and Posterity.

Article. I. Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Legislative Powers or the ability to make and pass laws, belong to Congress. The two parts that compose congress are the Senate and House of Representatives.

Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

Every two years, a new Representative can be chosen, or the same one re-elected. The most "numerous branch" is whichever division, House or Senate has the most members. Whatever qualifications one must have to vote for one of these shall be able to vote for members of the House of Representatives.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Self explanatory. Be at least 25, US Citizen for seven years, and reside in the state that one hopes to represent.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

Very difficult passage to interpret for several reasons. "Direct Taxes" is not defined but is usually considered to be taxes which are made against real and personal property. This direct tax is determined partly on the basis of the numbers of people within the state or states. An example of apportionment follows:

"Under the rule of apportionment, Congress sets the total amount to be raised by a direct tax, then divides that amount among the states according to each state’s population. Thus, a state with one-twentieth of the Nation’s population would be responsible for one-twentieth of the total amount of direct tax, without regard to that state’s income or wealth levels.

An 1861 federal tax on real property illustrates how the rule of apportionment operates. Congress enacted a direct tax of $20 million. After apportioning the direct tax among the states, territories, and the District of Columbia, the State of New York was liable for the largest portion of the tax, $2,603,918.67,10 and the Territory of Dakota was liable for the least, $3,241.33. The act called for the President to assign collection districts to states, territories, and the District of Columbia to apportion “to each county and State district its proper quota of direct tax” and determine the amounts taxpayers in each collection district would be required to pay." source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-9/clause-4/overview-of-direct-taxes

The rule of apportionment is circumvented by the 16th amendment which taxes income directly instead of the representing the original intention of apportionment.

Another controversial point concerns the 3/5ths of all other persons, which in the time and place this directive was made was understood to mean "slaves". However, it does not say "slaves", and so one wonders if immigrants that are not citizens or illegal aliens would qualify under this provision.

The rest of this portion concerns how often and when the enumeration should take place, along with some default numbers implemented until such numbering transpires.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

People must have representation.

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Presidential accountability can be found here along with selecting a speaker and whatever other positions need to be dealt with so the house runs smoothly.

Section. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Self-explanatory. Senate election periods established and voting power enumerated.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

This staggering ensures that the Senate is never completely upended in an election cycle:

As is still the practice today, the Constitution established that members of the Senate would be elected every six years, in two year increments. This means that, for example, in 1966, there was an election for 1/3 of the Senators. Those elected were not up for reelection again until 1972. But in 1968, there was also an election – for another 1/3 of the Senators, who served until 1974. And in 1970, there was an election for another 1/3 of the Senators, who served until 1976. There are two Senators per state, no matter the state’s population. Therefore, today, there are exactly 100 Senators (for 50 states). Additionally, the Constitution established, among other provisions of Article I, that Senators needed to be at least 30 years old, that the Vice-President of the United States casts a tie-breaking vote when necessary, and that the Senate is responsible for trying someone who has been impeached by the House. Source: https://constitutionallawreporter.com/article-01-section-03/

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

Senators are, interestingly, required to be older than representatives. They also are not to be an Inhabitant of the State they represent when elected. They must also have been a citizen for two more years compared to a representative.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

Vice President acts as a tiebreaker. Also they have power over the Senate.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

Senate has the power to select someone in case the Vice President is elsewhere to hold the position as well as additional roles as needed.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

The Senate can acts as a court for Impeachments. Automatic oath applies when they are in that capacity. The Chief Justice is the presiding judge if the President is tried, and the conviction requires two thirds of the Members.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Impeachment itself is limited to removal of holding office concerning the United States. The convicted party, however, may find themselves subject to additional legal liabilities and punishments.

Section. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

Basic leeway for establishing elections other than those regarding the election of senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Establishing meeting times for Congress.

Section. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

Each house has certain enforceable powers as mentioned.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

More powers defined.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Regulations on publishing the "minutes" of the proceeding and rules for possibly withholding those proceedings.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Neither house has the ability to adjourn on its own for more than three days or change the location.

Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

Payment is rendered for serving in the House and Senate which Law devises. Neither type of member can be arrested when they are in session.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Preventing conflicts of interest between representation and office holding.

Section. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

No taxation without representation.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

The balance of power between President and the houses outlined. Congress is not allowed to "game the system" by Adjourning before a Bill returns in order to make it law thereby.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Everything must pass before the eyes of the President.

Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

Taxes imposed along with other Congress appointed fees. Duties, Imposts, and Excises are to be uniform. These again, prove controversial:

The glossary from the U.S. Treasury Dept’s International Trade Data System http://www.itds.treas.gov/printglossaryfrm.html defines duty as “a tax levied by a government on the import or export of goods,” imposts as “a tax, especially an import duty,” and excise taxes as “taxes on the manufacture, sale, or consumption of goods, or upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, or upon corporate privileges,” which, they explain, in current usage covers about everything besides income taxes. It seems like the writers of the Constitution were throwing in all sorts of synonyms to cover the bases, although in the usage of the 18th century the words may have had other subtle differences. You might want to check an unabridged dictionary or the Oxford English Dictionary to get earlier definitions of these terms.

The uniformity clause makes AP’s head swim when reading about it. Basically, with regard to taxation, everyone must be treated the same within a jurisdiction (same tax rate, etc.). It’s pretty obvious that tea arriving at the port of Charleston would need to have the same rate of federal duties as tea arriving at the port of Baltimore. Beyond that, interpretation gets very, very complex and there seem to be a lot of court cases on whether a tax violates this clause or not. I think the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was to get around the problem of the income tax not being uniform in some persons’ eyes, i.e., it is apportioned based on income, which varies, rather than strictly on numbers of persons from the census. Also involved was the complicated issue of “direct” (applied to all instances of a good or service) versus “indirect” (applied sort of to a potential, like a licensing fee) taxes. Whether one interpreted the income tax as one or the other affected whether it violated the uniformity clause. However, all this gets into legal areas in which AP is not an expert, so you’re forbidden to quote me! You might want to check if the Law Library has an Answer Person (or perhaps a friendly reference librarian).

Source: https://blogs.library.duke.edu/answerperson/2004/10/04/taxes-duties-imposts-and-excises/

Not having a preferred port where taxes and duties are lower makes sense. Income tax, as outlined here, is out of keeping with the original ideas put forth. That places taxation relative to income, and places some incomes in a more "preferential" position than others.

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

Additional power is being granted to borrow money via Congress.

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

Here is a spot where uniformity of taxation might take place in the form of tarriffs--doing business with other nations.

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

Power to decide what it means to be a citizen, power to decide how Bankruptcies are defined and handled (Student loans come to mind).

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

Traditionally, these powers go to Kings and Queens. Here this is giving the government the ability to standardize markets and to develop financial systems.

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

Power to keep the currency genuine by stopping fraud thereof.

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

Mail and travel influences and funding are included here.

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

Beginning of patent law/copyright.

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

For decisions that need to be made that are not appropriate to the Supreme Court.

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

Subset of Admiralty law being delegated to Congress which typically a Tribunal would try as Admiralty Law is a form of military law.

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

"Marque and Reprisal" are authorizations to take the property of foreign parties like pirates. The same is being discussed about what Rules should appertain to making a capture on Land or Water.

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

Ability to make an Army and pay it for a period of two years.

To provide and maintain a Navy;

Ability to make and maintain a Navy.

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

Legislation or enforcement of rules over both of these forces.

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

Ability to call for the "well-regulated Militia" to stop abuses of power and to stop any outside invasion.

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

The US can Appoint Officers(and nobody else), for the Militia as well as train and discipline the same.

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And

Reserving special powers here for the "Seat of Government" which is not to exceed Ten Miles square. Whatever state this seat happens to reside within the Government will exercise authority over all buildings made with the Consent of the Legislature of said state.

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

A catch-all phrase for reserving any additional needed powers to do any and all of the above.

Section. 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

Concerned slavery:

This clause relates to the slave trade. It prevented Congress from restricting the importation of enslaved people before 1808. It did allow Congress to levy a duty of up to 10 dollars for each enslaved person. In 1807, the international slave trade was blocked and no more enslaved people were allowed to be imported legally into the United States. The enslavement of African people was still legal, however, within the United States until the end of the Civil War and the passage of the 13th Amendment in 1865.

Source: https://www.thoughtco.com/constitution-article-i-section-9-3322344

This clause seemed to anticipate the problems that slavery might bring, and sought to put an end to it early on.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

Again, the Civil War required a suspension of Habeas Corpus. What it means and who it applies to are legally debated:

This clause is the only place in the Constitution in which the Great Writ is mentioned, a strange fact in the context of the regard with which the right was held at the time the Constitution was written and stranger in the context of the role the right has come to play in the Supreme Court's efforts to constitutionalize federal and state criminal procedure.

Only the Federal Government and not the states, it has been held obliquely, is limited by the clause. The issue that has always excited critical attention is the authority in which the clause places the power to determine whether the circumstances warrant suspension of the privilege of the Writ. The clause itself does not specify, and although most of the clauses of § 9 are directed at Congress not all of them are. At the Convention, the first proposal of a suspending authority expressly vested "in the legislature" the suspending power, but the author of this proposal did not retain this language when the matter was taken up, the present language then being adopted. Nevertheless, Congress's power to suspend was assumed in early commentary and stated in dictum by the Court. President Lincoln suspended the privilege on his own motion in the early Civil War period, but this met with such opposition that he sought and received congressional authorization. Three other suspensions were subsequently ordered on the basis of more or less express authorizations from Congress.

When suspension operates, what is suspended? In Ex parte Milligan, the Court asserted that the Writ is not suspended but only the privilege, so that the Writ would issue and the issuing court on its return would determine whether the person applying can proceed, thereby passing on the constitutionality of the suspension and whether the petitioner is within the terms of the suspension.

Restrictions on habeas corpus placed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) have provided an occasion for further analysis of the scope of the Suspension Clause. AEDPA's restrictions on successive petitions from state prisoners are "well within the compass" of an evolving body of principles restraining "abuse of the writ," and hence do not amount to a suspension of the writ within the meaning of the Clause. Interpreting IIRIRA so as to avoid what it viewed as a serious constitutional problem, the Court in another case held that Congress had not evidenced clear intent to eliminate federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction to determine whether the Attorney General retained discretionary authority to waive deportation for a limited category of resident aliens who had entered guilty pleas before IIRIRA repealed the waiver authority. "[At] the absolute minimum," the Court wrote, "the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789. At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest."

Building on its statement concerning the "minimum" reach of the Suspension Clause, the Court, in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam (2020), explored what the habeas writ protected, as it existed in 1789. Thuraissigiam involved a Suspension Clause challenge to a provision in IIRIRA limiting when an asylum seeker could seek habeas review to challenge a removal decision and stay in the United States. Proceeding on the assumption that the Suspension Clause only prohibited limitations on the common-law habeas writ, the Court concluded that the writ at the time of the founding "simply provided a means of contesting the lawfulness of restraint and securing release." The asylum seeker in Thuraissigiam did not ask to be released from United States custody, but instead sought vacatur of his removal order and a new opportunity to apply for asylum, which if granted would enable him to remain in the United States. The Court concluded that such relief fell outside the scope of the common-law habeas writ. As a consequence, the Court held that, at least with respect to the relief sought by the respondent, Congress did not violate the Suspension Clause by limiting habeas relief for asylum seekers in IIRIRA.

The question remains as to what aspects of habeas are aspects of this broader habeas are protected against suspension. Noting that the statutory writ of habeas corpus has been expanded dramatically since the First Congress, the Court has written that it "assume[s] . . . that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789." This statement, however, appears to be in tension with the theory of congressionally defined habeas found in Bollman, unless one assumes that a habeas right, once created, cannot be diminished. The Court, however, in reviewing provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act that limited habeas, passed up an opportunity to delineate Congress's permissive authority over habeas, finding that none of the limitations to the writ in that statute raised questions of constitutional import.

In Boumediene v. Bush, in which the Court held that Congress's attempt to eliminate all federal habeas jurisdiction over "enemy combatant" detainees held at Guantanamo Bay violated the Suspension Clause. Although the Court did not explicitly identify whether the underlying right to habeas that was at issue arose from statute, common law, or the Constitution itself, it did decline to infer "too much" from the lack of historical examples of habeas being extended to enemy aliens held overseas. In Boumediene, the Court instead emphasized a "functional" approach that considered the citizenship and status of the detainee, the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made, the nature of the sites where apprehension and detention took place, and any practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ.

In further determining that the procedures afforded to the detainees to challenge their detention in court were not adequate substitutes for habeas, the Court noted the heightened due process concerns when detention is based principally on Executive Branch proceedings—here, Combatant Status Review Tribunals or (CSRTs)—rather than proceedings before a court of law. The Court also expressed concern that the detentions had, in some cases, lasted as long as six years without significant judicial oversight. The Court further noted the limitations at the CSRT stage on a detainee's ability to find and present evidence to challenge the government's case, the unavailability of assistance of counsel, the inability of a detainee to access certain classified government records which could contain critical allegations against him, and the admission of hearsay evidence. While reserving judgment as to whether the CSRT process itself comports with due process, the Court found that the appeals process for these decisions, assigned to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, did not contain the means necessary to correct errors occurring in the CSRT process.

source: https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation46.html

The backdrop of this law concerned monarchs who would arrest political opponents or someone they wished to lock in jail without the ability for them to ever get out, or understand why they had been placed there.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

A short sentence with long implication:

"Bills of attainder . . . are such special acts of the legislature, as inflict capital punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offences, such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If an act inflicts a milder degree of punishment than death, it is called a bill of pains and penalties. . . . In such cases, the legislature assumes judicial magistracy, pronouncing upon the guilt of the party without any of the common forms and guards of trial, and satisfying itself with proofs, when such proofs are within its reach, whether they are conformable to the rules of evidence, or not. In short, in all such cases, the legislature exercises the highest power of sovereignty, and what may be properly deemed an irresponsible despotic discretion, being governed solely by what it deems political necessity or expediency, and too often under the influence of unreasonable fears, or unfounded suspicions." The phrase "bill of attainder," as used in this clause and in clause 1 of § 10, applies to bills of pains and penalties as well as to the traditional bills of attainder.

The prohibition embodied in this clause is not to be narrowly construed in the context of traditional forms but is to be interpreted in accordance with the designs of the framers so as to preclude trial by legislature, which would violate the separation of powers. The clause thus prohibits all legislative acts, "no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. . . ." That the Court has applied the clause dynamically is revealed by a consideration of the three cases in which acts of Congress have been struck down as violating it. In Ex parte Garland, the Court struck down a statute that required attorneys to take an oath that they had taken no part in the Confederate rebellion against the United States before they could practice in federal courts. The statute, and a state constitutional amendment requiring a similar oath of persons before they could practice certain professions, were struck down as legislative acts inflicting punishment on a specific group the members of which had taken part in the rebellion and therefore could not truthfully take the oath. The clause then lay unused until 1946 when the Court used it to strike down a rider to an appropriations bill forbidding the use of money appropriated in the bill to pay the salaries of three named persons whom the House of Representatives wished discharged because they were deemed to be "subversive."

Then, in United States v. Brown, a sharply divided Court held void as a bill of attainder a statute making it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or as an employee of a labor union. Congress could, Chief Justice Warren wrote for the majority, under its commerce power, protect the economy from harm by enacting a prohibition generally applicable to any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics making him likely in Congress's view to initiate political strikes or other harmful deeds and leaving it to the courts to determine whether a particular person committed the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics. It was impermissible, however, for Congress to designate a class of persons—members of the Communist Party—as being forbidden to hold union office. The dissenters viewed the statute as merely expressing in shorthand the characteristics of those persons who were likely to utilize union responsibilities to accomplish harmful acts; Congress could validly conclude that all members of the Communist Party possessed those characteristics.

The majority's decision in Brown cast in doubt certain statutes and certain statutory formulations that had been held not to constitute bills of attainder. For example, a predecessor of the statute struck down in Brown, which had conditioned a union's access to the NLRB upon the filing of affidavits by all of the union's officers attesting that they were not members of or affiliated with the Communist Party, had been upheld, and although Chief Justice Warren distinguished the previous case from Brown on the basis that the Court in the previous decision had found the statute to be preventive rather than punitive, he then proceeded to reject the contention that the punishment necessary for a bill of attainder had to be punitive or retributive rather than preventive, thus undermining the prior decision. Of much greater significance was the effect of the Brown decision on "conflict-of-interest" legislation typified by that upheld in Board of Governors v. Agnew. The statute there forbade any partner or employee of a firm primarily engaged in underwriting securities from being a director of a national bank. Chief Justice Warren distinguished the prior decision and the statute on three grounds from the statute then under consideration. First, the union statute inflicted its deprivation upon the members of a suspect political group in typical bill-of-attainder fashion, unlike the statute in Agnew. Second, in the Agnew statute, Congress did not express a judgment upon certain men or members of a particular group; it rather concluded that any man placed in the two positions would suffer a temptation any man might yield to. Third, Congress established in the Agnew statute an objective standard of conduct expressed in shorthand which precluded persons from holding the two positions.

Apparently withdrawing from the Brown analysis in upholding a statute providing for governmental custody of documents and recordings accumulated during the tenure of former President Nixon, the Court set out a rather different formula for deciding bill of attainder cases. The law specifically applied only to President Nixon and directed an executive agency to assume control over the materials and prepare regulations providing for ultimate public dissemination of at least some of them; the act assumed that it did not deprive the former President of property rights but authorized the award of just compensation if it should be judicially determined that there was a taking.

First, the Court denied that the clause denies the power to Congress to burden some persons or groups while not so treating all other plausible individuals or groups; even the present law's specificity in referring to the former President by name and applying only to him did not condemn the act because "he constituted a legitimate class of one" on whom Congress could "fairly and rationally" focus. Second, even if the statute's specificity did bring it within the prohibition of the clause, the lodging of Mr. Nixon's materials with the GSA did not inflict punishment within the meaning of the clause.

This analysis was a three-pronged one: 1) the law imposed no punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the clause; 2) the law, viewed functionally in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, could rationally be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes; and 3) the law had no legislative record evincing a congressional intent to punish.That is, the Court, looking "to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of Congress who voted its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of legitimate explanations for its apparent effect," concluded that the statute served to further legitimate policies of preserving the availability of evidence for criminal trials and the functioning of the adversary legal system and in promoting the preservation of records of historical value, all in a way that did not and was not intended to punish the former President.

The clause protects individual persons and groups who are vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt and does not apply to a state; nor does a state have standing to invoke the clause for its citizens against the Federal Government.

Both federal and state governments are prohibited from enacting ex post facto laws and the Court applies the same analysis whether the law in question is a federal or a state enactment. When these prohibitions were adopted as part of the original Constitution, many persons understood the term ex post facto laws to "embrace all retrospective laws, or laws governing or controlling past transactions, whether . . . of a civil or a criminal nature." But in the early case of Calder v. Bull, the Supreme Court decided that the phrase, as used in the Constitution, was a term of art that applied only to penal and criminal statutes. But, although it is inapplicable to retroactive legislation of any other kind, the constitutional prohibition may not be evaded by giving a civil form to a measure that is essentially criminal. Every law that makes criminal an act that was innocent when done, or that inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed, is an ex post facto law within the prohibition of the Constitution. A prosecution under a temporary statute that was extended before the date originally set for its expiration does not offend this provision even though it is instituted subsequent to the extension of the statute's duration for a violation committed prior thereto. Because this provision does not apply to crimes committed outside the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country, it is immaterial in extradition proceedings whether the foreign law is ex post facto or not.

The issue of whether a law is civil or punitive in nature is essentially the same for ex post facto and for double jeopardy analysis. "A court must ascertain whether the legislature intended the statute to establish civil proceedings. A court will reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party challenging the Act provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention." A statute that has been held to be civil and not criminal in nature cannot be deemed punitive "as applied" to a single individual.

A variety of federal laws have been challenged as ex post facto. A statute that prescribed as a qualification for practice before the federal courts an oath that the attorney had not participated in the Rebellion was found unconstitutional because it operated as a punishment for past acts. But a statute that denied to polygamists the right to vote in a territorial election was upheld even as applied to one who had not contracted a polygamous marriage and had not cohabited with more than one woman since the act was passed, because the law did not operate as an additional penalty for the offense of polygamy but merely defined it as a disqualification of a voter. A deportation law authorizing the Secretary of Labor to expel aliens for criminal acts committed before its passage is not ex post facto because deportation is not a punishment. For this reason, a statute terminating payment of old-age benefits to an alien deported for Communist affiliation also is not ex post facto, for the denial of a non-contractual benefit to a deported alien is not a penalty but a regulation designed to relieve the Social Security System of administrative problems of supervision and enforcement likely to arise from disbursements to beneficiaries residing abroad. Likewise, an act permitting the cancellation of naturalization certificates obtained by fraud prior to the passage of the law was held not to impose a punishment, but instead simply to deprive the alien of his ill-gotten privileges.

A change of the place of trial of an alleged offense after its commission is not an ex post facto law. If no place of trial was provided when the offense was committed, Congress may designate the place of trial thereafter.A law that alters the rule of evidence to permit a person to be convicted upon less or different evidence than was required when the offense was committed is invalid, but a statute that simply enlarges the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases is not ex post facto as applied to a prosecution for a crime committed prior to its passage.

source: https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation47.html

In other words, there can be no special ordered executions or make laws that are punishing in some way that apply retroactively.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

This is, in essence, another way of saying that no taxes are to be made without representation and equal distribution:

Under Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 and Article I, Section 2, Clause 31 of the Constitution, direct taxes are subject to the rule of apportionment. Though the Supreme Court has not clearly distinguished direct taxes from indirect taxes, the Court has identified capitation taxes—a tax “paid by every person, ‘without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance’” —and taxes on real and personal property as direct taxes.

Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-9/clause-4/overview-of-direct-taxes

Contrasted with income tax which is not provided for here is interesting in that because a person has income of a certain amount it does not follow they have representation. Therefore, a tax leveled at someone without representation is the entire scenario designed to be prevented by these stipulations.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No preferential business taxation to any given state can be leveled by Congress.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No funny business in port to port movement.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No dipping the had into the Treasury except for that which is made by Law.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

Keeping conflicts of interest to a minimun while in service to the United States.

Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

State limits. Note how the Confederacy would have been prohibited by this clause.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

Keeping States from making up their own rules to potentially improve their own lot at the expense if the rest.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Keeps states from amassing their own alliances and armies. Again, this would have made the Confederacy illegal.

Article. II. Section. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows

Defining where the power is, and the duration thereof.

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

State Elector rules. Again, limitation to prevent conflict of interest.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.

Some commentary:

Under the original Constitution, each member of the Electoral College cast two electoral votes, with no distinction between electoral votes for president or for vice president. The presidential candidate receiving the greatest number of votes—provided that number was at least a majority of the electors—was elected president, while the presidential candidate receiving the second-most votes was elected vice president. In cases where no individual won the votes of a majority of the electors, as well as in cases where multiple persons won the votes of a majority but tied for the most votes, the House of Representatives would hold a contingent election to select the president. In cases where multiple candidates tied for the second-most votes, the Senate would hold a contingent election to select the vice president. The first four presidential elections were conducted under these rules.

The original system allowed the 1796 and 1800 presidential elections to elect a president and vice-president who were political opponents, constantly acting at cross-purposes. This spurred legislators to amend the presidential election process to require each member of the Electoral College to cast one electoral vote for president and one electoral vote for vice president. Under the new rules, a contingent election is still held by the House of Representatives if no candidate wins the presidential electoral vote of a majority of the electors, but there is no longer any possibility of multiple candidates winning presidential electoral votes from a majority of the vice presidential electoral vote, and provided that no individual constitutionally ineligible to the office of president would be eligible to serve as vice president.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelfth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

Self evident statement.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

Keeping foreign influences out of the office of President.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

Congress's ability to remove a President and to appoint successors in a variety of cases outlined.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Payment for doing the job of President is issued, but the amount won't be changed to keep from having the office influenced by it.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Oath the President must assume.

Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

Commander and chief of Army and Navy and Militia. Ability to get opinions from those in other offices, and ability to pardon or reprieve crimes against the US except Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

Presidential power to make treaties with the Consent of 2/3rds of the Senate. Additional power to grant other officers as needed.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Power to deal with potential vacancies.

Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

State of the Union updates--ability to convene both houses or adjourn them. Receiving Ambassadors and other representatives, and executing all Laws faithfully as well as Commissioning Officers of the United States.

Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Clearly stated.

Article. III. Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Good behavior warrants some discussion here.

The meaning of the Good Behavior Clause has been the subject of long-standing debate. Some have argued that the phrase denotes an alternative standard of removal for federal judges beyond high crimes and misdemeanors that normally may give rise to the impeachment of federal officers. Others have rejected this notion, reading the good behavior phrase simply to make clear that federal judges retain their office for life unless they are removed via a proper constitutional mechanism. However, while one might find some support in early twentieth-century practice for the idea that the Clause constitutes an additional ground for removal of a federal judge, the modern view of Congress appears to be that good behavior does not establish an independent standard for impeachable conduct. In other words, the Good Behavior Clause simply indicates that judges are not appointed to their seats for set terms and cannot be removed at will; removing a federal judge requires impeachment and conviction for a high crime or misdemeanor.

Nevertheless, even if the Good Behavior Clause does not delineate a standard for impeachment and removal for federal judges, as a practical matter, the history of impeachments in the United States might indicate that the range of conduct meriting removal differs between judges and Executive Branch officials due to the distinct nature of each office. The Senate has never voted to remove the President or an Executive Branch official, but has done so to eight federal judges.5The conduct meriting impeachment and removal for federal judges has ranged from intoxication on the bench, to abandoning the office and joining the Confederacy, to various types of corruption. Congress has also impeached and removed federal judges for perjury and income tax evasion, although it is unclear whether such behavior would necessarily be considered impeachable behavior for an Executive Branch official.

Further, leaving aside whether the Good Behavior Clause establishes a separate standard for removal independent from high crimes and misdemeanors, historical conflicts between Congress and the Judiciary may inform the outer limits of what the Good Behavior Clause entails. For instance, in 1804 Jeffersonian Republicans attempted to remove Supreme Court Chief Justice Samuel Chase, who they viewed as openly partisan and biased against their party. The allegations against Chief Justice Chase included that he acted in an arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust manner at trial, misapplied the law, and expressed partisan political views to a grand jury. The attempt failed, and Congress has never removed a federal judge for disagreement with the law’s application or because of difference in political views. Based on this historical practice, the good behavior standard arguably guards against the removal of a federal judge for disagreement with the law’s interpretation or political disagreements.

That said, the Good Behavior Clause and the attendant clauses expressly dealing with impeachment do not insulate federal judges from criminal prosecutions. For instance, Judge Harry E. Claiborne, before being impeached and removed from office as a federal judge, challenged his indictment and prosecution as unconstitutional. Specifically, he argued that the Constitution’s vesting of the impeachment power in Congress precludes the criminal prosecution of an Article III judge unless he is first impeached and removed from office. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the Constitution’s distinction between impeachment and criminal liability was meant to ensure that no individual who had been impeached and removed could claim double jeopardy as a shield against subsequent criminal prosecution. Further, a criminal conviction does not remove an individual from office; Congress retains exclusive power to do so through the constitutional mechanism of impeachment. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit rejected Claiborne’s argument that it violates separation of powers for the Executive Branch to possess authority to bring criminal prosecutions against sitting Article III judges. The court noted that potential defendants receive the same protections that ordinary citizens do, and criminal behavior is not part of a government official’s duties.Further, insulating federal judges from criminal liability would elevate them above the requirements of the very law they are entrusted with adjudicating fairly.

Source: https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S1-10-2-3/ALDE_00000686/

Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;— between a State and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

Reach of judicial power.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

Supreme Court decides on persons of some standing like Ambassadors where there are such cases. In other Cases, the Supreme Court carries the ability to hear appeals.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Trial in the state where the crime was, or if not in a state, where Congress directs.

Section. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

Again, this would have made all the States the declared war on the United States during the Civil War guilty of treason. By extension, everyone who was given comfort to those combatants would also have been guilty of treason.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

Another concept that needs some explanation:

The Constitution also narrowed the scope of punishment for treason as compared to English common law. The final clause of this Section establishes that, while Congress has the general power to establish the penalties for committing treason, Congress may not “work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person” convicted of treason. “Corruption of blood” is a reference to English common law, which prohibited family members from—among other things—receiving or inheriting property from a person convicted of treason. Under the Constitution, that punishment may not extend beyond the life of the person convicted of treason.

source: https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/articles/article-iii/clauses/39

Article. IV. Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

No state favorites when it comes to records, and judicial matters. Congress can indicate how all of those things are to be conducted, and what happens when they are conducted in the approved manner.

Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

No rights favorites per state. Same in all States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

State cooperation with other states for crimes committed.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

Additional commentary is required:

This Clause, effectively nullified by the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery, contemplated the existence of a right on the part of a slaveholder to reclaim an enslaved person who had escaped to another state. Following the debate on the constitutional provision requiring states to return felons who had fled from one state to another, Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved to require fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals. Although James Wilson and Roger Sherman objected that this would oblige the executive of the State to seize fugitive slaves, at the public expense, the provision was approved by the Convention unanimously without further debate. Congress had the power to enact legislation enforcing the Clause, which it first did in 1793. Under the

Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fugitive Slave Clause, the owner of an enslaved person had the same right to seize and repossess him in another state as the local laws of his own state granted to him, and state laws that penalized such a seizure were unconstitutional. Moreover, states had no concurrent power to legislate on the subject. However, a state statute providing a penalty for harboring an escaped slave was held not to conflict with the Clause because it did not affect the right or remedy of the slaveholder, but rather a rule of conduct for its own citizens in the exercise of states’ police power.

Source: https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIV-S2-C3-1/ALDE_00013571/

Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

Another Civil War violation of the original Constitutional design.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Further interpretation:

Not all of the lands that are owned or controlled by the United States are states. Some lands are territories, and Congress has the power to sell off or regulate the territories. This includes allowing U.S. territories to become independent nations, as was done with the Philippines, or regulating the affairs of current U.S. territories like the District of Columbia, Guam, or Puerto Rico. In addition, this provision gives Congress the power to set rules for lands owned by the United States, such as the national parks and national forests. The last sentence of this clause makes sure that nothing in the Constitution would harm the rights of either the federal government or the states in disputes over property.

Source: https://www.annenbergclassroom.org/article-iv-section-3/

Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

Purpose is to keep the States from being overrun or invaded of the Federal Government of the United States. This extends to domestic violence, or those things that happen from within a country that are injurious to it.

Article. V. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Ability to amend the Consitution by 3/4s agreement among the States or Conventions.

Article. VI. All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

Carryover of debts into the US post constitution.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

More commentary:

Instead of giving Congress additional powers, the Supremacy Clause simply addresses the legal status of the laws that other parts of the Constitution empower Congress to make, as well as the legal status of treaties and the Constitution itself. The core message of the Supremacy Clause is simple: the Constitution and federal laws (of the types listed in the first part of the Clause) take priority over any conflicting rules of state law. This principle is so familiar that we often take it for granted. Still, the Supremacy Clause has several notable features.

To begin with, the Supremacy Clause contains the Constitution’s most explicit references to what lawyers call “judicial review”—the idea that even duly enacted statutes do not supply rules of decision for courts to the extent that the statutes are unconstitutional. Some scholars say that the Supremacy Clause’s reference to “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance of the Constitution” itself incorporates this idea; in their view, a federal statute is not “made in Pursuance of the Constitution” unless the Constitution really authorizes Congress to make it. Other scholars say that this phrase simply refers to the lawmaking process described in Article I, and does not necessarily distinguish duly enacted federal statutes that conform to the Constitution from duly enacted federal statutes that do not. But no matter how one parses this specific phrase, the Supremacy Clause unquestionably describes the Constitution as “Law” of the sort that courts apply. That point is a pillar of the argument for judicial review. In addition, the Supremacy Clause explicitly specifies that the Constitution binds the judges in every state notwithstanding any state laws to the contrary.

The Supremacy Clause also establishes a noteworthy principle about treaties. Under the traditional British rule, treaties made by the Crown committed Great Britain on the international stage, but they did not have domestic legal effect; if Parliament wanted British courts to apply rules of decision drawn from a treaty, Parliament needed to enact implementing legislation. The Supremacy Clause breaks from this principle. Subject to limits found elsewhere in the Constitution, treaties are capable of directly establishing rules of decision for American courts.

This aspect of the Supremacy Clause reflected concerns that individual states were jeopardizing the fledgling nation’s security by putting the United States in violation of its treaty obligations. For instance, at the end of the Revolutionary War, Article IV of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain had specified that “creditors on either side[] shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.” Nonetheless, several states enacted or retained debtor-relief laws whose enforcement against British creditors would violate this promise, and British diplomats argued that these violations excused Britain’s own failure to withdraw all armies and garrisons from the United States. The Supremacy Clause responded to this problem: just as state courts were not supposed to apply state laws that conflicted with the Constitution itself, so too state courts were not supposed to apply state laws that conflicted with Article IV of the Treaty of Peace. Indeed, the peculiar wording of the Supremacy Clause—covering treaties already “made . . . under the Authority of the United States” as well as treaties that “shall be made” in the future—was specifically designed to encompass pre-existing agreements like the Treaty of Peace. While modern scholars have debated the circumstances in which treaties should be understood to establish rules of decision for cases in American courts, the Supremacy Clause unquestionably makes such treaties possible.

Under the Supremacy Clause, the “supreme Law of the Land” also includes federal statutes enacted by Congress. Within the limits of the powers that Congress gets from other parts of the Constitution, Congress can establish rules of decision that American courts are bound to apply, even if state law purports to supply contrary rules. Congress also has at least some authority to put certain topics wholly off limits to state law, or otherwise to restrict what state law can validly say about those topics. As long as the directives that Congress enacts are indeed authorized by the Constitution, they take priority over both the ordinary laws and the constitution of each individual state. (During the ratification period, Anti-Federalists objected to the fact that federal statutes and treaties could override aspects of each state’s constitution and bill of rights. But while this feature of the Supremacy Clause was controversial, it is unambiguous.)

In modern times, the Supreme Court has recognized various ways in which federal statutes can displace or “preempt” state law. Some federal statutes include express “preemption clauses” forbidding states to enact or enforce certain kinds of laws. A few other federal statutes have been interpreted as implicitly stripping states of lawmaking power throughout a particular field. But even when a federal statute does not contain an express preemption clause, and even when the statute does not implicitly occupy an entire field to the exclusion of state law, the directives that the statute validly establishes still supersede any conflicting directives that the law of an individual state might purport to supply.

Every year, courts decide an enormous number of cases that involve whether a particular federal statute should be understood to preempt a particular aspect of state law. Often, the key disputes in these cases boil down to questions of statutory interpretation. (If the relevant federal statute includes a preemption clause, what does the clause mean? Should any additional instructions about preemption be inferred? And what is the precise content of all the other legal directives that the statute establishes, whether expressly or by implication?) But apart from disputes about what the relevant federal statute should be understood to say and imply, and apart from any disputes about whether the Constitution really gives Congress the power to say and imply those things, some preemption cases may implicate disagreements about the Supremacy Clause itself. Of course, the basic principle that valid federal statutes preempt conflicting rules of state law is not controversial. But different judicial opinions suggest different views about what counts as a conflict for this purpose, and some of those disagreements may grow out of the Supremacy Clause: while there is no doubt that the Supremacy Clause sometimes requires courts to disregard rules of decision purportedly supplied by state law, there is room for debate about the precise trigger for that requirement.

Source: https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/articles/article-vi/clauses/31

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Loyalty is to the principles of the Constitution, but not a specific belief system.

Article. VII. The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

Establishment of the Constitution clause.

In simpler terms, it means that once nine out of the thirteen original colonies agreed to and ratified the Constitution through their respective state conventions, the Constitution would then be considered effective and binding between those states. This reflects the pragmatic approach of the Constitution's Framers, who anticipated that seeking unanimous consent from all thirteen states could be impractical or unachievable.

Every state was required to hold its own ratifying convention wherein delegates would discuss and ultimately vote on whether to ratify the Constitution. The requirement for only nine states instead of all thirteen to ratify was a strategic decision to ensure the Constitution could be adopted and enacted without unanimous consent, which was seen as an unlikely outcome.

Source: https://brainly.com/question/43330066

The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, The Word "Thirty" being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and forty fourth Lines of the second Page.

Attest William Jackson Secretary

done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independance of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,

G°. Washington Presidt and deputy from Virginia